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Early detection and response to meningococcal disease
epidemics in sub-SaharanAfrica: appraisal of theWHOstrategy
J.A.D. Leake,1 M.L. Kone,2 A.A. Yada,2 L.F. Barry,3 G. Traore,3 A. Ware,3 T. Coulibaly,4 A. Berthe,4 H. Mambu Ma
Disu,4 N.E. Rosenstein,1 B.D. Plikaytis,1 K. Esteves,5 J. Kawamata,5 J.D. Wenger,5 D.L. Heymann,5 & B.A. Perkins1
Objective To assess the sensitivity, specificity and predictive value positive of the WHO threshold strategy for detecting meningococcal
disease epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa and to estimate the impact of the strategy on an epidemic at district level.
Methods Data on meningitis cases at the district level were collected weekly from health ministries, WHO country and regional offices, and
nongovernmental organizations in countries where there were epidemics of meningococcal disease in 1997. An epidemic was defined as a
cumulative district attack rate of at least 100 cases per 100 000 population from January to May, the period of epidemic risk. The sensitivity,
specificity and predictive value positive of the WHO threshold rate were calculated, and curves of sensitivity against (1 – specificity) were
compared with alternatively defined threshold rates and epidemic sizes. The impact of the WHO strategy on a district epidemic was
estimated by comparing the numbers of epidemic cases with cases estimated to have been prevented by vaccination.
Findings An analysis was made of 48 198 cases reported in 174 districts in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and
Togo. These cases were 80.3% of those reported from Africa to WHO during the 1997 epidemic period. District populations ranged
from 10 298 to 573 908. The threshold rate was crossed during two consecutive weeks in 69 districts (39.7%) and there were
epidemics in 66 districts (37.9%). Overall, the sensitivity of the threshold rate for predicting epidemics was 97%, the specificity was
95%, and the predictive value positive was 93%. Taken together, these values were equivalent or better than the sensitivity, specificity
and predictive value positive of alternatively defined threshold rates and epidemics, and remained high regardless of district size. The
estimated number of potential epidemic cases decreased by nearly 60% in the age group targeted for vaccination in one district where
the guidelines were followed in a timely manner.
Conclusion The use of the WHO strategy was sensitive and specific for the early detection of meningococcal disease epidemics in
countries of sub-Saharan Africa during 1997 and had a substantial impact on a district epidemic. Nevertheless, the burden of
meningococcal disease in these countries remains formidable and additional control measures are needed.
Keywords Meningitis, Meningococcal/epidemiology; Disease outbreaks/prevention and control; Meningococcal vaccines/therapeutic
use; Immunization programs; Sensitivity and specificity; Predictive value of tests; Africa South of the Sahara (source: MeSH, NLM ).
Mots cle´s Me´ningite me´ningococcique/e´pide´miologie; Epide´mie/pre´vention et controˆle; Vaccins antime´ningococciques/usage
the´rapeutique; Programmes de vaccination; Sensibilite´ et spe´cificite´ (Epide´miologie); Valeur pre´dictive tests; Afrique subsaharienne
(source: MeSH, INSERM).
Palabras clave Meningitis meningoco´cica/epidemiologı´a; Brotes de enfermedades/prevencio´n y control; Vacunas meningoco´cicas/uso
terape´utico; Programas de inmunizacio´n; Sensibilidad y especificidad; Valor predictivo de los tests; A´frica del Sur (fuente: DeCS, BIREME ).
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Introduction
Meningococcal disease epidemics occur throughout the world
(1–5) but are most severe in the sub-Saharan African
meningitis belt, where they have recurred since the early 20th
century (6). This belt extends from Senegal to Ethiopia and
includes 15 countries with an estimated population of over
270 000 000. Epidemics almost invariably take place during the
dry season, i.e. from December until May, and end when the
rainy season begins (7). During the dry season, meningococcus
is presumed to cause meningitis. The terms ‘‘meningitis’’ and
‘‘meningococcal disease’’ are usually used synonymously. As
yet it has been impossible to predict epidemics during a given
year in particular districts or countries.
Recently, epidemics of meningococcal disease have
severely affected many countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The
intervals between large-scale epidemics may be decreasing (8,
9). In 1996 and 1997,WHO reported 189 690 and 71 339 cases
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ofmeningitis respectively inAfrica (9). Case-fatalities exceeded
10% during both years. The epidemic in 1996 was the largest
ever recorded in a single year, and substantial underreporting of
both cases and deaths probably occurred (10). Both epidemics
were caused by the serogroup A III.1 clone, which has
circulated throughout the region for over a decade (11, 12), but
serogroup C meningococci have also caused or significantly
contributed to other recent epidemics (13).
The WHO strategy for the control of epidemic meningo-
coccal disease links the early prediction of epidemics with rapidly
conducted mass vaccination campaigns (1). A threshold model
of epidemic detection is used for early prediction. The threshold
rate is 15 cases per 100 000 population per week averaged over
two successive weeks. When the threshold strategy was first
evaluated it was found to have reasonably good sensitivity (72–
93%), specificity (92–100%) and predictive value positive (65–
97%), and the population size considered most appropriate for
epidemic prediction ranged from 30 000 to 100 000 (14). The
potential impact of the strategy on epidemics depends on rapid
detection and prompt mass vaccination campaigns. It has
frequently been difficult to coordinate these activities in a timely
manner in the meningitis belt (15).
Meningococcal polysaccharide vaccines have been avail-
able for several decades (16). Serogroups A and C are present in
most such vaccines used in the region. These vaccines have
repeatedly been shown to be more than 85% efficacious in the
prevention of invasive meningococcal disease in Africa (17) and
elsewhere. At least in developed countries, immunity lasts five
years or longer among most healthy vaccinated adults (18).
Since the introduction of the threshold strategy in 1995
an intensive multinational effort has promoted its use through
the improvement of epidemic detection and response capacity.
However, severe epidemics of meningococcal disease have
continued to occur and the effectiveness of the strategy has
therefore been questioned. The aims of the present study were
to determine whether the strategy was still sufficiently sensitive
and specific for detecting epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa and
to estimate its impact on an epidemic at the district level.
Methods
Calculation of sensitivity, specificity and predictive
value positive
In 1997 we collected data weekly at the district level from
health ministries, WHO country and regional offices, and
nongovernmental organizations in every country where there
were significant numbers of meningitis cases between January
and May, the period of highest epidemic risk 1997. Incidence
rates were calculated using denominators obtained from health
ministries at the district, regional or national level. The districts
were stratified into population quartiles.
On the basis of the threshold rate of 15 cases per
100 000 population per week and using data from all districts
included in the analysis, we calculated sensitivity, specificity
and predictive value positive as aggregate values. The WHO
definition of a district epidemic as an overall attack rate of at
least 100 per 100 000 population per year was used. Districts
with incomplete surveillance data were excluded.
Two sets of curves of sensitivity against (1 – specificity)
were constructed for different weekly incidence thresholds of
meningitis. Data from all districts included in the analysis were
used for the first set, whereas data from districts stratified by
population quartile were used for the second. In order to assess
whether alternative thresholds or epidemic definitions im-
proved sensitivity or specificity relative to the WHO guide-
lines, sensitivity and specificity were compared graphically for
threshold values ranging from 2 to 26 cases per 100 000 po-
pulation per week in increments of 2 and for alternative
epidemic definitions of 50 and 75 per 100 000 population per
year. Sensitivity, specificity and predictive value positive were
also calculated in relation to a threshold definition of515 per
100 000 per week for two successive, not averaged, weeks.
Cases prevented
We collected data on weekly attack rates, vaccine coverage rates,
and dates of a vaccination campaign in a medium-sized district
(Reo District, Koudougou Region, Burkina Faso) in order to
estimate the impact of the threshold strategy on an epidemic at
this level. Meningococcal disease was defined as being present in
persons with compatible symptoms and signs of meningitis and
turbid cerebrospinal fluid (1). Confirmation by culture was not
available. Coverage rates during the vaccination campaign were
estimated on the basis of the proportion of control subjects
vaccinated in a case-control study of vaccine efficacy conducted
during April andMay 1997 (19). The controls were persons aged
at least 5 years who were matched to cases by age category and
place of residence. Interviews with subjects were conducted in
their native language 7–14 days after a mass vaccination
campaign with bivalent A/C meningococcal polysaccharide
vaccine. The subjects were asked about their meningococcal
vaccination status, which was confirmed by the examination of
vaccination cards if these were available. For comparison the
proportion of cases prevented per epidemic was estimated on
the basis of vaccine coverage rates obtained from district
ministry of health sources.
The number of cases prevented by vaccination was
estimated in the age group targeted during the vaccination
campaign. This involved comparing attack rates among
vaccinated and unvaccinated persons by means of the
following equations (17).
Weekly overall AR = (VAR x PV)/(NVAR x PNV);
VAR= 0.15 xNVAR; 0.15 = (1 – VE). AR is attack rate; VAR,
attack rate among vaccinated persons; NVAR, attack rate
among unvaccinated persons; PV, proportion of population
vaccinated; PNV, proportion of population not vaccinated;
VE, vaccine efficacy, defined as 85% for the purposes of this
analysis.
The estimated numbers of cases prevented were
summed two weeks after the end of the vaccination campaign
in order to allow for the development of post-vaccination
antibody responses (16). The proportion of the epidemic
prevented was calculated as:
estimated cases prevented/epidemic cases + estimated
cases prevented.
Statistical analysis
EpiInfo (version 6.04) was used for data entry and analysis
of weekly district-level meningitis cases, the case-control
study of vaccine efficacy, and chi-square calculation for
comparison of proportions of districts crossing the epidemic
threshold stratified by population quartile. SAS (Release
6.12, SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA) was used to construct
tables of districts and thresholds, and curves of sensitivity
against (1 – specificity).
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Results
An analysis was made of 48 198 cases in 174 districts in Benin,
Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Togo
(Table 1). These cases amounted to 80.3% of those reported
from Africa to WHO during the 1997 epidemic period (2). A
total of 69 districts (39.7%) crossed the WHO threshold and
66 districts (37.9%) had epidemics, i.e. at least 100 cases per
100 000 population. Three districts (1.7%) with incomplete
data were excluded from the analysis.
District populations ranged from 10 298 to 573 908 per-
sons (median = 176 291); 33 districts (19%) had populations in
the range 30 000 to 100 000; 75% had populations of at least
100 000, and 45% had populations of at least 200 000. The
quartiles of district population in thousands were: <111 (n=40),
111–<176 (n=46), 176–<248 (n=47), and5 248 (n=41). The
proportions of districts crossing the epidemic threshold for at
least two consecutive weeks were 18%, 43%, 49% and 39% in
the respective quartiles (P = 0.04) (Fig.1).
Sensitivity, specificity and predictive value positive
Using districts with cumulative attack rates of at least 100 per
100 000 population as the standard, the overall sensitivity of
the threshold was 97.0%, the specificity was 95.4% and the
predictive value positive 92.8% (Table 2). These parameters
were similar when data from each country, not shown here,
were examined separately. The examination of weekly thresh-
old values ranging from 2 to 26 cases per 100 000, averaged
over two weeks, revealed that the threshold of 15 per
100 000 population had comparable or better specificity and
predictive value positive for a given sensitivity than other
thresholds for predicting yearly epidemics of 100 cases/
100 000 population (Fig. 2). The values did not change
significantly when the sensitivity, specificity and predictive
value positive were calculated on the basis of a threshold rate of
15 per 100 000 population for two successive but not averaged
weeks (Table 3). For districts of the second largest and largest
quartiles of population size the sensitivity decreased to 88%
and 80% respectively, whereas the specificity remained
uniformly good for all districts regardless of population size
(Table 4).
Cases prevented
A total of 2881 cases (attack rate for whole district = 1119/
100 000) and 316 deaths (case-fatality rate = 11%) occurred
during a 12-week meningococcal disease epidemic in Reo
District, Koudougou Region, Burkina Faso (estimated 1997
Table 1. African countries with large-scale meningococcal
disease epidemics, 1997
Country Cases reported Number of cases Number of
to WHO (up to analysed (% of districts
1 June 1997) total reported cases)a analysed
Burkina Faso 21 504 18 377 (84.5) 50
Ghana 18 551 12 531 (67.5) 24
Mali 10 960 10 178 (92.9) 45
Niger 3922 4198 (107)a 38
Togo 2619 2072 (79.1) 3
The Gambia 913 807 (88.4) 1
Benin 360 35 (9.7) 13
Other countries 1181 – –
Totala 60 010 48 198 (80.3) 174
Source: reference 2.
a Includes cases reported to WHO for the period after 1 June 1997. For complete
1997 case figures, see reference 9.
Table 2. Numbers of districts above and below weekly threshold
of 15 per 100 000 averaged over two consecutive weeks vs
yearly attack rate of 100 cases/100 000
Yearly attack rate
Threshold rate 5 100 < 100 Total
515 64 5 69
<15 2 103 105
66 108 174
Sensitivity: 64/(64+2) = 97.0%; 95% confidence interval = 88.5–99.5%.
Specificity: 103/(103+5) = 95.4%; 95% confidence interval = 89.0–98.3%.
Predictive value positive: 64/(64+5) = 92.8%; 95% confidence interval =
83.29–7.3%. Predictive value negative: (103/103+2) = 98.1%; 95%
confidence interval = 92.6–99.7%.
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population = 257 367). The epidemic threshold was crossed in
early February and the weekly attack rate peaked at 159 per
100 000 in mid-March. Vaccination campaigns were per-
formed over a period of six days and were completed within
two weeks after the epidemic threshold was crossed for the
second consecutive week. The epidemic subsided in late April.
Among the 120 control subjects in a case-control study of
vaccine efficacy living in the village of Reo, vaccine coverage
amounted to 86%.
A total of 4217 cases were estimated to have been
prevented during the six weeks following the vaccination
campaign while the epidemic subsided, allowing two weeks
after the end of the campaign for the development of humoral
immunity among vaccinated persons. This number repre-
sented nearly 1.5 times that of observed cases, or 59.4% of the
total number of epidemic cases predicted in the absence of
vaccination (Fig. 3). On the assumption that the observed case-
fatality rate remained constant at 11% it was estimated that
464 deaths were prevented by vaccination. Alternative data for
the entire district obtained from the health ministry, viz. the
number of doses given divided by the estimated target
population, indicated vaccine coverage to be 64%. The use of
this value resulted in a lower estimate of the proportion of
epidemic cases prevented, namely 46%.
Discussion
The WHO threshold strategy was found to be sensitive and
specific in the prediction of epidemicmeningococcal disease in
seven African countries during 1997. No other threshold or
epidemic definition performed as well or significantly better
when sensitivity, specificity and predictive value positive were
considered together. A number of thresholds were found to be
reasonably sensitive and specific for predicting epidemics of
various size, as has been suggested elsewhere (20, 21). It is
possible that lowering the threshold from 15 to 10 per 100 000
per week in high-risk epidemic situations, e.g. for increases in
incidence observed early during the meningitis season, would
allow even higher sensitivity and earlier epidemic detection
with minimal sacrifices in specificity and predictive value
positive (21–24). However, the maximization of each of these
parameters is critical. A reduction in sensitivity leads to delayed
detection of epidemics and potentially reduces the number of
cases and deaths averted through vaccination. Reductions in
specificity and predictive value positive lead to vaccination
campaigns of suboptimal impact in the absence of an ensuing,
but predicted, epidemic. Such campaigns place considerable
demands on human and material resources in countries where
both are in very short supply.
The most appropriate denominator range for the use of
the threshold in districts has been suggested as 30 000 to
100 000 persons (1, 14). In the present study, however, it
emerged that sensitivity and specificity were very good in
districts with populations of up to 175 000 and reasonably
good even in very large districts. We found that districts with
over 110 000 people were more likely to cross the threshold,
suggesting that the transmission ofmeningococcal diseasemay
be comparatively rapid and/or sustainable in areas of high
population density. This finding should be interpreted
cautiously, however, since surveillance may be more complete
and timely in districts with relatively large populations.
By comparing actual and theoretical epidemic curves in
one district experiencing a large-scale epidemic, we found that
nearly three-fifths of meningococcal disease cases were
prevented through the timely application of the threshold
strategy. This number is close to a recently published estimate
of the strategy’s potential impact (15). In the district analysed,
vaccine coverage rates were higher and the vaccination
campaign was conductedmore promptly than in other districts
studied during the past decade (17, 25). This explains the
higher estimated impact of the strategy in our study, and
refutes the notion that delays in implementation of the
threshold strategy are inevitable in the region (26).
Although the threshold strategy was a sensitive and
specific predictor of district epidemics and had a significant
impact on an epidemic at the district level, it has both
theoretical and practical limitations. Assuming a vaccine
efficacy of at least 85% (16) and optimal levels of achievable
Table 3.Numbers of districts above and belowweekly threshold
of 15 cases per 100 000 for two consecutive weeks vs yearly
attack rate of 100 cases/100 000
Yearly attack rate
Threshold rate 5 100 < 100 Total
515 60 3 63
<15 6 105 111
66 108 174
Sensitivity: 60/(60+6) = 90.9%.
Specificity: 105/(105+3) = 97.2%.
Predictive value positive: 60/(60+3) = 95.2%.
Predictive value negative: (105/105+3) = 97.2%.
Table 4. Sensitivity and specificity of WHO threshold by
district size
District size (in 1000s) Sensitivity Specificity
<111 (n = 40) 100 97
111–<176 (n = 46) 100 93
176–<248 (n = 47) 88 95
5 248 (n = 41) 80 93
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vaccine coverage of 85%, as in the district studied, the
threshold strategy’s maximum potential for epidemic reduc-
tion is approximately 72% (85 x 0.85), starting days to weeks
after vaccination, depending on the humoral immune
response. In a sub-Saharan African district of average size
and weekly epidemic activity, numerous cases per week might
still occur even with strict adherence to the threshold strategy.
Besides the theoretical limits, in Africa there are formidable
practical barriers to the control of epidemic diseases. Delays in
communication between peripheral and national authorities
increase the time between the detection of epidemics and the
performance of vaccination. The inadequacy of vaccine
supplies and logistics may decrease the effectiveness of the
threshold even when an epidemic is rapidly detected. The
threshold strategy is difficult to implement among sparsely
scattered populations that are inaccessible by road. The
strategy’s effectiveness is probably diminished more by these
and other practical difficulties than by the theoretical limits.
Although routine immunization has been proposed as an
alternative to the currently recommended WHO threshold
strategy (27, 28), arguments have been made against the
preventive use of meningococcal polysaccharide vaccines in
developing and industrialized countries alike. Studies in sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere have indicated that meningo-
coccal polysaccharide vaccines are poorly immunogenic,
perhaps especially so in areas with high rates of malnutrition,
malaria and geohelminth infections (29, 30), and that they
confer only evanescent protection among children aged under
4 years, among whom the risk is highest (31). They produce a
limited booster effect and may attenuate serum bactericidal
responses to meningococcal serogroups A and C upon
revaccination (32, 33). In most settings they do not appreciably
or durably alter nasopharyngeal carriage rates (34–36).
Furthermore, even with antigens of longstanding use, routine
EPI vaccine coverage rates rarely surpass 50–60% in sub-
Saharan African countries (37).
Controversy exists concerning the potential cost-
effectiveness of preventive meningococcal vaccination in
sub-Saharan Africa. A simulated epidemic model suggested
that routine vaccination might be more cost-effective than
mass vaccination strategies (38), but an analysis of data from
Burkina Faso indicated that four preventive doses of
meningococcal polysaccharide vaccine would prevent only
30% of meningitis cases as opposed to 42% through the
WHO strategy (39). Strategies other than preventive vaccina-
tion are clearly needed (40, 41).
The present study had several limitations. The sensitiv-
ity, specificity and predictive value positive of the threshold
strategy were calculated using data collected during a large-
scale epidemic; whether the strategy would be effective in the
control of smaller epidemics or endemic disease is uncertain.
Frequently, there is incomplete and late case-reporting from
health centres, the most peripheral African health care access
points, to district, regional and national health authorities. Over
a quarter of the cases that occurred in six countries during 1997
were reported late, i.e. after a delay of at least three months, to
national health authorities and WHO (2, 9). In order to
maximize the number of districts analysed, data were obtained
largely through national sources, which may not have reflected
the true incidence of meningococcal disease at district level.
This is evidently a problem in relation to other infectious
diseases in Africa (42). In the almost complete absence of
laboratory confirmation the strategy’s impact might have been
underestimated if meningococcal disease cases were caused by
other virulent serogroups, e.g. W-135, not included in the
bivalent A+C vaccines used inmost campaigns at district level
(43–45). Finally, our estimated impact of the strategy on the
basis of data from a single district with high vaccine coverage
and minimal delay in vaccination may not represent the
strategy’s impact on other district epidemics, as discussed
above. Measuring the impact of the WHO strategy in sub-
Saharan Africa requires a longitudinal sample of representative
districts experiencing diverse epidemic conditions and re-
sponse capacities (46).
Additional meningococcal disease control measures are
needed in Africa. The identification of districts at high risk for
epidemics (23) and the evaluation of preventive vaccination or
other, e.g. treatment-based, strategies (47), are priorities for
research. However, there is a paucity of data suggesting that
preventive strategies significantly alter the epidemiology of
meningococcal disease in actual African districts (48) and
there is little evidence that improved control of epidemics can
be expected through the use of alternatively defined thresh-
olds or other strategies. Many investigators feel that
strengthened implementation of the WHO threshold ap-
proach is critical for improved meningococcal disease control
in this region (49, 50).
One of the most promising prospects for improving the
control of meningococcal disease involves using meningo-
coccal capsular polysaccharide-protein conjugate vaccines (50,
51). In clinical trials in the Gambia (52), Niger (53), and the
USA (54), meningococcal conjugate vaccines produced up to
20 times more serum bactericidal activity than polysaccharide
vaccines. Direct evidence and experience with Haemophilus
influenzae type b conjugate vaccines suggests that immunol-
ogical memory and herd immunity, mediated via the
interruption of nasopharyngeal carriage, are also possible
advantages (55–58). Efforts should be made to expedite the
licensing of meningococcal conjugate vaccines and to reduce
their cost in order to permit their earliest possible use in
developing countries. n
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Re´sume´
De´tection et re´ponse pre´coces en cas d’e´pide´mie de me´ningite a` me´ningocoque en Afrique subsaharienne :
e´valuation de la strate´gie OMS
Objectif Evaluer la sensibilite´, la spe´cificite´ et la valeur pre´dictive
positive de la strate´gie OMS fonde´e sur l’utilisation d’un seuil
e´pide´mique pour de´tecter les e´pide´mies de me´ningite a`
me´ningocoque en Afrique subsaharienne, et estimer l’impact de
cette strate´gie sur une e´pide´mie au niveau du district.
Me´thodes Les donne´es sur les cas de me´ningite a` me´ningocoque
au niveau du district ont e´te´ recueillies une fois par semaine aupre`s
des ministe`res de la sante´, des bureaux re´gionaux de l’OMS, des
bureaux de l’OMS dans les pays et des organisations non
gouvernementales, dans les pays ou` des e´pide´mies de me´ningite a`
me´ningocoque ont se´vi en 1997. Une e´pide´mie e´tait de´finie par un
taux d’atteinte cumule´ au niveau du district d’au moins 100 cas pour
100 000 habitants de janvier a` mai, pendant la pe´riode de risque
e´pide´mique. La sensibilite´, la spe´cificite´ et la valeur pre´dictive
positive du seuil utilise´ par l’OMS ont e´te´ calcule´es, et on a compare´
les courbes de sensibilite´ en fonction de la valeur (1-spe´cificite´) pour
diffe´rentes valeurs du seuil et d’autres de´finitions de l’e´pide´mie.
L’impact de la strate´gie OMS sur une e´pide´mie survenue dans un
district a e´te´ estime´ par comparaison entre le nombre de cas
e´pide´miques et le nombre estime´ de cas e´vite´s graˆce a` la vaccination.
Re´sultats L’analyse a porte´ sur 48 198 cas rapporte´s dans
174 districts du Be´nin, du Burkina Faso, de Gambie, du Ghana, du
Mali, du Niger et du Togo. Ces cas repre´sentaient 80,3 % des cas
rapporte´s par l’Afrique a` l’OMS pendant la pe´riode e´pide´mique de
1997. Les districts comptaient entre 10 298 et 573 908 habitants.
Le seuil e´pide´mique a e´te´ franchi pendant deux semaines
conse´cutives dans 69 districts (39,7 %) et 66 districts (37,9 %)
ont e´te´ touche´s par une e´pide´mie. Globalement, la sensibilite´ du
seuil e´pide´mique pour la pre´vision des e´pide´mies e´tait de 97 %, sa
spe´cificite´ de 95 % et sa valeur pre´dictive positive de 93 %. Prises
ensemble, ces valeurs e´taient e´quivalentes ou supe´rieures aux
valeurs correspondantes pour des seuils diffe´rents et d’autres
de´finitions de l’e´pide´mie, et restaient e´leve´es quelle que soit la
taille du district. Le nombre estime´ de cas e´pide´miques potentiels
avait diminue´ de pre`s de 60 % dans le groupe d’aˆge vise´ par la
vaccination dans un district ou` les directives avaient e´te´ applique´es
en temps voulu.
Conclusion L’utilisation de la strate´gie OMS e´tait un moyen
sensible et spe´cifique de de´tection pre´coce des e´pide´mies de
me´ningite a` me´ningocoque qui ont touche´ les pays d’Afrique
subsaharienne en 1997 et a eu un impact important sur l’e´pide´mie
dans un district. Ne´anmoins, le poids de la me´ningite a`
me´ningocoque dans ces pays reste e´norme et des mesures de
lutte supple´mentaires sont ne´cessaires.
Resumen
Deteccio´n y respuesta precoces en las epidemias de enfermedad meningoco´cica en el A´frica subsahariana:
evaluacio´n de la estrategia de la OMS
Objetivo Evaluar la sensibilidad, la especificidad y el valor
predictivo positivo de la estrategia de umbral de la OMS para la
deteccio´n de las epidemias de enfermedad meningoco´cica en el
A´frica subsahariana, y estimar el impacto de la estrategia en una
epidemia a nivel de distrito.
Me´todos Con periodicidad semanal se reunieron datos sobre los
casos de meningitis a nivel de distrito a partir de los ministerios de
salud, de las oficinas regionales y de paı´s de la OMS y de
organizaciones no gubernamentales en paı´ses donde habı´a
epidemias de enfermedad meningoco´cica en 1997. Se considero´
que habı´a epidemia cuando la tasa acumulativa de ataques por
distrito alcanzaba al menos los 100 casos por 100 000 habitantes
entre enero y mayo, el periodo de riesgo de epidemia. Se calcularon
la sensibilidad, la especificidad y el valor predictivo positivo de la
tasa umbral de la OMS y se compararon las curvas de sensibilidad
frente al valor (1-especificidad) para diferentes umbrales y
dimensiones de la epidemia. El impacto de la estrategia de la
OMS en una epidemia de a´mbito distrital se calculo´ comparando
las cifras de los casos epide´micos y los casos que segu´n las
estimaciones se habı´an prevenido mediante la vacunacio´n.
Resultados Se analizaron 48 198 casos notificados en 174 dis-
tritos de Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Malı´, Nı´ger y Togo.
Estos casos representaban el 80,3% de los notificados por A´frica a
la OMS durante el periodo epide´mico de 1997. La poblacio´n de los
distritos iba de 10 298 a 573 908 personas. La tasa umbral fue
superada durante dos semanas consecutivas en 69 distritos
(39,7%), y hubo epidemias en 66 distritos (37,9%). A nivel global,
la sensibilidad de la tasa umbral para predecir las epidemias fue del
97%, la especificidad del 95%, y el valor predictivo positivo
del 93%. Considerados conjuntamente, estos valores alcanzaban
o superaban la sensibilidad, la especificidad y el valor predictivo
positivo observados al definir de otra forma las tasas umbral y las
epidemias, y seguı´an siendo altos con independencia del taman˜o
del distrito. El nu´mero estimado de casos epide´micos potenciales
disminuyo´ casi en un 60% en el grupo de edad elegido para
vacunacio´n en un distrito donde se siguieron puntualmente las
directrices.
Conclusio´n La estrategia de la OMS funciono´ como una
alternativa sensible y especı´fica para detectar precozmente las
epidemias de la enfermedad meningoco´cica en los paı´ses del A´frica
subsahariana durante 1997 y tuvo una repercusio´n sustancial en la
epidemia de un distrito. No obstante, la carga de enfermedad
meningoco´cica sigue siendo enorme en esos paı´ses, lo que hace
necesarias medidas de control adicionales.
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